Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00268R000800020007-7

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ∀r. Bundy

DATE: 26 October 1955

FROM : R. L. Hewitt

ONE Comments 24 Oct Drft

SUBJECT: O/NE Staff Comments on ME Section, 24 October Draft Report of Working Group on Local Aggression and Subversion

Some hasty comments from Keith Clark and myself:

face? ported fin Para 1. Most conspicuous danger is the extent to which grievances of area states against the West offer the Soviets opportunity, with minimum of expense, to portray their area objectives as identical with those of such area states. They can thus touch off or stoke up anti-Western fires without running the risks of conducting a very active subversive campaign, which could be counterproductive from their point of view, since it might frighten local governments.

Para 3. Overtures to Saudis should be mentioned.

Para 4. Baghdad Pact is a skeleton organization designed to have pro-Western political and psychological effects, in the first instance, and to serve as the basis for eventual development of regional defense against Soviet attack in a general war. Its relevance to "local aggression" appears limited.

Fara 7. Our memo to the director (passed on to Hoover) is relevant to reference to Iraqi and Syrian intervention in Syria, though it probably did not adequately relate dangers of supporting Iraq to possibly greater dangers of letting things slide.

Para 9. Reference to Syria and Egypt confusing. In Egypt we had straight military takeover. In Syria particular danger is that the army, which might undertake revolution, is heavily infiltrated with leftists, fellow-travelling element.